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Abstract
The Bayesian framework is a well-studied and successful framework for induc-
tive reasoning, which includes hypothesis testing and confirmation, parameter
estimation, sequence prediction, classification, and regression. But standard
statistical guidelines for choosing the model class and prior are not always
available or can fail, in particular in complex situations. Solomonoff com-
pleted the Bayesian framework by providing a rigorous, unique, formal, and
universal choice for the model class and the prior. I discuss in breadth how
and in which sense universal (non-i.i.d.) sequence prediction solves various
(philosophical) problems of traditional Bayesian sequence prediction. I show
that Solomonoff’s model possesses many desirable properties: Strong total
and future bounds, and weak instantaneous bounds, and in contrast to most
classical continuous prior densities has no zero p(oste)rior problem, i.e. can
confirm universal hypotheses, is reparametrization and regrouping invariant,
and avoids the old-evidence and updating problem. It even performs well
(actually better) in non-computable environments.
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1 Introduction
“... in spite of it’s incomputability, Algorithmic Probability can serve as
a kind of ‘Gold Standard’ for induction systems”
— Ray Solomonoff (1997)
Given the weather in the past, what is the probability of rain tomorrow? What
is the correct answer in an IQ test asking to continue the sequence 1,4,9,16,? Given
historic stock-charts, can one predict the quotes of tomorrow? Assuming the sun rose
5000 years every day, how likely is doomsday (that the sun does not rise) tomorrow?
These are instances of the important problem of induction or time-series forecasting
or sequence prediction. Finding prediction rules for every particular (new) problem
is possible but cumbersome and prone to disagreement or contradiction. What is
desirable is a formal general theory for prediction.
The Bayesian framework is the most consistent and successful framework de-
veloped thus far [Ear93, Jay03]. A Bayesian considers a set of environments=
=hypotheses=models M which includes the true data generating probability distri-
bution µ. From one’s prior belief wν in environment ν∈M and the observed data
sequence x= x1...xn, Bayes’ rule yields one’s posterior confidence in ν. In a pre-
quential [Daw84] or transductive [Vap99, Sec.9.1] setting, one directly determines
the predictive probability of the next symbol xn+1 without the intermediate step
of identifying a (true or good or causal or useful) model. With the exception of
Section 4, this paper concentrates on prediction rather than model identification.
The ultimate goal is to make “good” predictions in the sense of maximizing one’s
profit or minimizing one’s loss. Note that classification and regression can be re-
garded as special sequence prediction problems, where the sequence x1y1...xnynxn+1
of (x,y)-pairs is given and the class label or function value yn+1 shall be predicted.
The Bayesian framework leaves open how to choose the model classM and prior
wν . General guidelines are thatM should be small but large enough to contain the
true environment µ, and wν should reflect one’s prior (subjective) belief in ν or
should be non-informative or neutral or objective if no prior knowledge is available.
But these are informal and ambiguous considerations outside the formal Bayesian
framework. Solomonoff’s [Sol64] rigorous, essentially unique, formal, and universal
solution to this problem is to consider a single large universal class MU suitable
for all induction problems. The corresponding universal prior wUν is biased towards
simple environments in such a way that it dominates (=superior to) all other priors.
This leads to an a priori probability M(x) which is equivalent to the probability
that a universal Turing machine with random input tape outputs x, and the shortest
program computing x produces the most likely continuation (prediction) of x.
Many interesting, important, and deep results have been proven for Solomonoff’s
universal distributionM [ZL70, Sol78, Ga´c83, LV97, Hut01, Hut04]. The motivation
and goal of this paper is to provide a broad discussion of how and in which sense
universal sequence prediction solves all kinds of (philosophical) problems of Bayesian
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sequence prediction, and to present some recent results. Many arguments and ideas
could be further developed. I hope that the exposition stimulates such a future,
more detailed, investigation.
In Section 2, I review the excellent predictive and decision-theoretic performance
results of Bayesian sequence prediction for generic (non-i.i.d.) countable and contin-
uous model classes. Section 3 critically reviews the classical principles (indifference,
symmetry, minimax) for obtaining objective priors, introduces the universal prior
inspired by Occam’s razor and quantified in terms of Kolmogorov complexity. In
Section 4 (for i.i.d. M) and Section 5 (for universal MU) I show various desirable
properties of the universal prior and class (non-zero p(oste)rior, confirmation of uni-
versal hypotheses, reparametrization and regrouping invariance, no old-evidence and
updating problem) in contrast to (most) classical continuous prior densities. I also
complement the general total bounds of Section 2 with some universal and some
i.i.d.-specific instantaneous and future bounds. Finally, I show that the universal
mixture performs better than classical continuous mixtures, even in uncomputable
environments. Section 6 contains critique, summary, and conclusions.
The reparametrization and regrouping invariance, the (weak) instantaneous
bounds, the good performance of M in non-computable environments, and most
of the discussion (zero prior and universal hypotheses, old evidence) are new or new
in the light of universal sequence prediction. Technical and mathematical non-trivial
new results are the Hellinger-like loss bound (8) and the instantaneous bounds (14)
and (17).
2 Bayesian Sequence Prediction
I now formally introduce the Bayesian sequence prediction setup and describe the
most important results. I consider sequences over a finite alphabet, assume that
the true environment is unknown but known to belong to a countable or continuous
class of environments (no i.i.d. or Markov or stationarity assumption), and consider
general prior. I show that the predictive distribution converges rapidly to the true
sampling distribution and that the Bayes-optimal predictor performs excellent for
any bounded loss function.
Notation. I use letters t,n∈IN for natural numbers, and denote the cardinality of
a set S by #S or |S|. I write X ∗ for the set of finite strings over some alphabet
X , and X∞ for the set of infinite sequences. For a string x∈X ∗ of length ℓ(x)=n
I write x1x2...xn with xt ∈ X , and further abbreviate xt:n := xtxt+1...xn−1xn and
x<n :=x1...xn−1.
I assume that sequence ω=ω1:∞ ∈X∞ is sampled from the “true” probability
measure µ, i.e. µ(x1:n) :=P[ω1:n=x1:n|µ] is the µ-probability that ω starts with x1:n.
I denote expectations w.r.t. µ by E. In particular for a function f :X n→IR, we have
E[f ] =E[f(ω1:n)]=
∑
x1:n
µ(x1:n)f(x1:n). Note that in Bayesian learning, measures,
environments, and models coincide, and are the same objects; let M= {ν1,ν2,...}
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denote a countable class of these measures. Assume that (a) µ is unknown but
known to be a member of M, (b) {Hν : ν ∈M} forms a mutually exclusive and
complete class of hypotheses, and (c) wν := P[Hν ] is the given prior belief in Hν .
Then ξ(x1:n) := P[ω1:n = x1:n] =
∑
ν∈MP[ω1:n = x1:n|Hν ]P[Hν ] must be our (prior)
belief in x1:n, and wν(x1:n) :=P[Hν |ω1:n=x1:n] = P[ω1:n=x1:n|Hν ]P[Hν ]P[ω1:n=x1:n] be our posterior
belief in ν by Bayes’ rule.
For a sequence a1,a2,... of random variables,
∑∞
t=1E[a
2
t ]≤ c<∞ implies att→∞−→0
with µ-probability 1 (w.p.1). Convergence is rapid in the sense that the probability
that a2t exceeds ε>0 at more than
c
εδ
times t is bounded by δ. I sometimes loosely
call this the number of errors.
Sequence prediction. Given a sequence x1x2...xt−1, we want to predict its likely
continuation xt. I assume that the strings which have to be continued are drawn
from a “true” probability distribution µ. The maximal prior information a prediction
algorithm can possess is the exact knowledge of µ, but often the true distribution is
unknown. Instead, prediction is based on a guess ρ of µ. While I require µ to be a
measure, I allow ρ to be a semimeasure [LV97, Hut04]:1 Formally, ρ :X ∗→ [0,1] is
a semimeasure if ρ(x)≥∑a∈Xρ(xa) ∀x∈X ∗, and a (probability) measure if equality
holds and ρ(ǫ)=1, where ǫ is the empty string. ρ(x) denotes the ρ-probability that
a sequence starts with string x. Further, ρ(a|x) :=ρ(xa)/ρ(x) is the “posterior” or
“predictive” ρ-probability that the next symbol is a∈X , given sequence x∈X ∗.
Bayes mixture. We may know or assume that µ belongs to some countable class
M :={ν1,ν2,...}∋µ of semimeasures. Then we can use the weighted average on M
(Bayes-mixture, data evidence, marginal)
ξ(x) :=
∑
ν∈M
wν ·ν(x),
∑
ν∈M
wν ≤ 1, wν > 0 (1)
for prediction. One may interpret wν =P[Hν ] as prior belief in ν and ξ(x)=P[x]
as the subjective probability of x, and µ(x)=P[x|µ] is the sampling distribution or
likelihood. The most important property of semimeasure ξ is its dominance
ξ(x) ≥ wνν(x) ∀x and ∀ν∈M, in particular ξ(x) ≥ wµµ(x) (2)
which is a strong form of absolute continuity.
Convergence for deterministic environments. In the predictive setting we are
not interested in identifying the true environment, but to predict the next symbol
well. Let us consider deterministic µ first. An environment is called deterministic if
µ(α1:n)=1∀n for some sequence α, and µ=0 elsewhere (off-sequence). In this case
we identify µ with α and the following holds:
∞∑
t=1
|1−ξ(αt|α<t)| ≤ lnw−1α and ξ(αt:n|αt)→ 1 for n ≥ t→∞ (3)
1Readers unfamiliar or uneasy with semimeasures can without loss ignore this technicality.
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where wα>0 is the weight of α=̂µ∈M. This shows that ξ(αt|α<t) rapidly converges
to 1 and hence also ξ(α¯t|α<t)→ 0 for α¯t 6=αt, and that ξ is also a good multi-step
lookahead predictor. Proof: ξ(α1:n)→ c > 0, since ξ(α1:n) is monotone decreasing
in n and ξ(α1:n)≥wµµ(α1:n)=wµ>0. Hence ξ(α1:n)/ξ(α1:t)→ c/c=1 for any limit
sequence t,n→∞. The bound follows from ∑nt=11−ξ(xt|x<t)≤−∑nt=1lnξ(xt|x<t)=
−lnξ(x1:n) and ξ(α1:n)≥wα.
Convergence in probabilistic environments. In the general probabilistic case
we want to know how close ξ(xt|x<t) is to the true probability µ(xt|x<t). One
convenient distance measure is the (squared) Hellinger distance
ht(ω<t) :=
∑
a∈X
(
√
ξ(a|ω<t)−
√
µ(a|ω<t))2 (4)
One can show [Hut03a, Hut04] that
n∑
t=1
E
[(√
ξ(ωt|ω<t)
µ(ωt|ω<t)
−1
)2]
≤
n∑
t=1
E[ht] ≤ Dn(µ||ξ) := E[ln µ(ω1:n)ξ(ω1:n) ] ≤ lnw−1µ (5)
The first two inequalities actually hold for any two (semi)measures, and the last
inequality follows from (2). These bounds (with n=∞) imply ht→0 and hence
ξ(xt|ω<t)− µ(xt|ω<t)→ 0 for any xt and ξ(ωt|ω<t)µ(ωt|ω<t) → 1, both rapid w.p.1 for t→∞
An improved bound E[exp(1
2
∑
tht)]≤w−1/2µ [HM04] even shows that the probability
that
∑
tht additively exceeds lnw
−1
µ by c (e.g. c>10) is tiny e
−c/2. One can also show
multi-step lookahead convergence ξ(xt:nt|ω<t)−µ(xt:nt|ω<t)→0 (even for unbounded
horizon 1≤nt−t+1→∞), which is interesting for delayed sequence prediction and
in reactive environments [Hut04]. Since ξ rapidly converges to µ, one can anticipate
that also decisions based on ξ are good.
Bayesian decisions. Let ℓxtyt ∈ [0,1] be the received loss when predicting yt∈Y ,
but xt ∈ X turns out to be the true tth symbol of the sequence. The ρ-optimal
predictor
yΛρt (ω<t) := argmin
yt
∑
xt
ρ(xt|ω<t)ℓxtyt (6)
minimizes the ρ-expected loss. For instance for X =Y = {0,1}, Λρ is a threshold
strategy with yΛρt =0/1 for ρ(1|ω<t) >< γ, where γ := ℓ01−ℓ00ℓ01−ℓ00+ℓ10−ℓ11 . The instantaneous
loss at time t and the total µ(=true)-expected loss for the first n symbols are
lΛρt (ω<t) := E[ℓωtyΛρt |ω<t] and LΛρn :=
n∑
t=1
E[ℓωtyΛρt ] (7)
Let Λ be any prediction scheme (deterministic or probabilistic) with no constraint
at all, taking any action yΛt ∈Y with total expected loss LΛn . If µ is known, Λµ is
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obviously the best prediction scheme in the sense of achieving minimal expected loss
LΛµn ≤LΛn for any Λ. For the predictor Λξ based on the Bayes mixture ξ, one can
show (proof in Appendix A; see also [MF98, Hut03a] for related bounds)
(
√
LΛξn −
√
LΛµn )
2 ≤
n∑
t=1
E[(
√
lΛξt −
√
lΛµt )
2] ≤
n∑
t=1
2E[ht] (8)
which actually holds for any two (semi)measures. Chaining with (5) implies,
for instance, lΛξt → lΛµt rapid w.p.1,
√
LΛξn exceeds
√
LΛµn by at most
√
2lnw−1µ ,
LΛξn /L
Λµ
n →1 for LΛµn →∞, or if LΛµ∞ is finite, then also LΛξ∞ . This shows that ξ (via
Λξ) performs also excellent from a decision-theoretic perspective, i.e. suffers loss only
slightly larger than the optimal Λµ predictor.
One can also show that Λξ is Pareto-optimal (admissible) in the sense that every
other predictor with smaller loss than Λξ in some environment ν∈M must be worse
in another environment [Hut03c].
Continuous environmental classes. I will argue later that countable M are
sufficiently large from a philosophical and computational perspective. On the other
hand, countable M exclude all continuously parameterized families (like the class
of all i.i.d. or Markov processes), common in statistical practice. I show that the
bounds above remain approximately valid for most parametric model classes. Let
M := {νθ : θ ∈ Θ ⊆ IRd}
be a family of probability distributions parameterized by a d-dimensional continuous
parameter θ, and µ≡ νθ0 ∈M the true generating distribution. For a continuous
weight density2 w(θ)>0 the sums (1) are naturally replaced by integrals:
ξ(x1:n) :=
∫
Θ
w(θ)·νθ(x1:n) dθ,
∫
Θ
w(θ) dθ = 1 (9)
The most important property of ξ was the dominance (2) achieved by dropping the
sum over ν. The analogous construction here is to restrict the integral over θ to
a small vicinity of θ0. Since a continuous parameter can typically be estimated to
accuracy ∝n−1/2 after n observations, the largest volume in which νθ as a function
of θ is approximately flat is ∝ (n−1/2)d, hence ξ(x1:n)& n−d/2w(θ0)µ(x1:n). Under
some weak regularity conditions one can prove [CB90, Hut03c]
Dn(µ||ξ) := E ln µ(ω1:n)ξ(ω1:n) ≤ lnw(θ0)−1 + d2 ln n2π + 12 ln det ¯n(θ0) + o(1) (10)
where w(θ0) is the weight density (9) of µ in ξ, and o(1) tends to zero for n→∞,
and the average Fisher information matrix ¯n(θ)=− 1nE[∇θ∇Tθ lnνθ(ω1:n)] measures
the local smoothness of νθ and is bounded for many reasonable classes, including all
stationary (kth-order) finite-state Markov processes. See Section 4 for an application
2w() will always denote densities, and w() probabilities.
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to the i.i.d. (k=0) case. We see that in the continuous case, Dn is no longer bounded
by a constant, but grows very slowly (logarithmically) with n, which still implies
that ε-deviations are exponentially seldom. Hence, (10) allows to bound (5) and (8)
even in case of continuous M.
3 How to Choose the Prior
I showed in the last section how to predict if the true environment µ is unknown, but
known to belong some class M of environments. In this section, I assume M to be
given, and discuss how to (universally) choose the prior wν . After reviewing various
classical principles (indifference, symmetry, minimax) for obtaining objective priors
for “small” M, I discuss large M. Occam’s razor in conjunction with Epicurus’
principle of multiple explanations, quantified by Kolmogorov complexity, leads us
to a universal prior, which results in a better predictor than any other prior over
countable M.
Classical principles. The probability axioms (implying Bayes’ rule) allow to com-
pute posteriors and predictive distributions from prior ones, but are mute about how
to choose the prior. Much has been written on the choice of priors (see [KW96] for
a survey and references). A main classification is between objective and subjective
priors. An objective prior wν is a prior constructed based on some rational princi-
ples, which ideally everyone without (relevant) extra prior knowledge should adopt.
In contrast, a subjective prior aims at modelling the agents personal (subjective)
belief in environment ν prior to observation of x, but based on his past personal
experience or knowledge (e.g. of related phenomena). In Section 6, I show that one
way to arrive at a subjective prior is to start with an objective prior, make all past
personal experience explicit, determine a “posterior” and use it as subjective prior.
So I concentrate in the following on the more important objective priors.
Consider a very simple case of two environments, e.g. a biased coin with head
or tail probability 1/3. In absence of any extra knowledge (which I henceforth
assume) there is no reason to prefer head probability θ = 1/3 over θ = 2/3 and
vice versa, leaving w1/3=w2/3=
1
2
as the only rational choice. More generally, for
finite M, the symmetry or indifference argument [Lap12] suggests to set wν = 1|M|
∀ν ∈M. Similarly for a compact measurable parameter space Θ we may choose a
uniform density w(θ)= [Vol(Θ)]−1. But there is a problem: If we go to a different
parametrization (e.g. θ ; θ′ :=
√
θ in the Bernoulli case), the prior w(θ);w′(θ′)
becomes non-uniform. Jeffreys’ [Jef46] solution is to find a symmetry group of the
problem (like permutations for finiteM) and require the prior to be invariant under
group transformations. For instance, if θ∈IR is a location parameter (e.g. the mean)
it is natural to require a translation-invariant prior. Problems are that there may be
no obvious symmetry, the resulting prior may be improper (like for the translation
group), and the result can depend on which parameters are treated as nuisance
parameters.
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The maximum entropy principle extends the symmetry principle by allowing
certain types of constraints on the parameters. Conjugate priors are classes of priors
such that the posteriors are themselves again in the class. While this can lead to
interesting classes, the principle itself is not selective, since e.g. the class of all priors
forms a conjugate class.
Another minimax approach by Bernardo [Ber79, CB90] is to consider bound (10),
which can actually be improved within o(1) to an equality. Since we want Dn to
be small, we minimize the r.h.s. for the worst µ ∈M. Choice w(θ)∝√det¯n(θ)
equalizes and hence minimizes (10). The problems are the same as for Jeffrey’s
prior (actually often both priors coincide), and also the dependence on the model
class and potentially on n.
The principles above, although not unproblematic, can provide good objective
priors in many cases of small discrete or compact spaces, but we will meet some more
problems later. For “large” model classes I am interested in, i.e. countably infinite,
non-compact, or non-parametric spaces, the principles typically do not apply or
break down.
Occam’s razor et al. Machine learning, the computer science branch of statis-
tics, often deals with very large model classes. Naturally, machine learning has
(re)discovered and exploited quite different principles for choosing priors, appropri-
ate for this situation. The overarching principles put together by Solomonoff [Sol64]
are: Occam’s razor (choose the simplest model consistent with the data), Epicurus’
principle of multiple explanations (keep all explanations consistent with the data),
(Universal) Turing machines (to compute, quantify and assign codes to all quanti-
ties of interest), and Kolmogorov complexity (to define what simplicity/complexity
means).
I will first “derive” the so called universal prior, and subsequently justify it by
presenting various welcome theoretical properties and by examples. The idea is that
a priori, i.e. before seeing the data, all models are “consistent,” so a-priori Epicurus
would regard all models (inM) possible, i.e. choose wν>0 ∀ν∈M. In order to also
do (some) justice to Occam’s razor we should prefer simple hypotheses, i.e. assign
high prior (low) prior wν to simple (complex) hypotheses Hν . Before I can define
this prior, I need to quantify the notion of complexity.
Notation. A function f :S→ IR∪{±∞} is said to be lower semi-computable (or
enumerable) if the set {(x,y) : y < f(x), x∈S, y ∈ IQ} is recursively enumerable. f
is upper semi-computable (or co-enumerable) if −f is enumerable. f is computable
(or recursive) if f and −f are enumerable. The set of (co)enumerable functions
is recursively enumerable. I write O(1) for a constant of reasonable size: For in-
stance, a sequence of length 100 is reasonable, maybe even 230, but 2500 is not. I
write f(x)
+≤ g(x) for f(x)≤g(x)+O(1) and f(x) ×≤ g(x) for f(x)≤2O(1) ·g(x). Cor-
responding equalities hold if the inequalities hold in both directions.3 We say that
a property A(n)∈{true,false} holds for most n, if #{t≤n :A(t)}/nn→∞−→1.
3I will ignore these additive and multiplicative fudges in the discussion till Section 6.
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Kolmogorov complexity. We can now quantify the complexity of a string. Intu-
itively, a string is simple if it can be described in a few words, like “the string of one
million ones”, and is complex if there is no such short description, like for a random
object whose shortest description is specifying it bit by bit. We are interested in
effective descriptions, and hence restrict decoders to be Turing machines (TMs).
Let us choose some universal (so-called prefix) Turing machine U with binary in-
put=program tape, X ary output tape, and bidirectional work tape. We can then
define the prefix Kolmogorov complexity [Cha75, Ga´c74, Kol65, Lev74] of string x as
the length ℓ of the shortest binary program p for which U outputs x:
K(x) := min
p
{ℓ(p) : U(p) = x}
Simple strings like 000...0 can be generated by short programs, and, hence have low
Kolmogorov complexity, but irregular (e.g. random) strings are their own shortest
description, and hence have high Kolmogorov complexity. For non-string objects
o (like numbers and functions) we define K(o) :=K(〈o〉), where 〈o〉 ∈ X ∗ is some
standard code for o. In particular, if (fi)
∞
i=1 is an enumeration of all (co)enumerable
functions, we define K(fi)=K(i).
An important property of K is that it is nearly independent of the choice of
U . More precisely, if we switch from one universal TM to another, K(x) changes
at most by an additive constant independent of x. For natural universal TMs, the
compiler constant is of reasonable size O(1). A defining property of K :X ∗→ IN
is that it additively dominates all co-enumerable functions f :X ∗→ IN that satisfy
Kraft’s inequality
∑
x2
−f(x) ≤ 1, i.e. K(x) +≤ f(x) for K(f)=O(1). The universal
TM provides a shorter prefix code than any other effective prefix code. K shares
many properties with Shannon’s entropy (information measure) S, but K is superior
to S in many respects. To be brief, K is an excellent universal complexity measure,
suitable for quantifying Occam’s razor. We need the following properties of K:
a) K is not computable, but only upper semi-computable,
b) the upper bound K(n)
+≤ log2n+2log2logn, (11)
c) Kraft’s inequality
∑
x2
−K(x)≤1, which implies 2−K(n)≤ 1
n
for most n,
d) information non-increase K(f(x))
+≤K(x)+K(f) for recursive f :X ∗→X ∗,
e) K(x)
+≤−log2P (x)+K(P ) if P :X ∗→ [0,1] is enumerable and
∑
xP (x)≤1,
f)
∑
x:f(x)=y2
−K(x) ×=2−K(y) if f is recursive and K(f)=O(1).
The proof of (f) can be found in Appendix A and the proofs of (a)−(e) in [LV97].
The universal prior. We can now quantify a prior biased towards simple models.
First, we quantify the complexity of an environment ν or hypothesis Hν by its
Kolmogorov complexity K(ν). The universal prior should be a decreasing function
in the model’s complexity, and of course sum to (less than) one. Since K satisfies
Kraft’s inequality (11c), this suggests the following choice:
wν = w
U
ν := 2
−K(ν) (12)
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For this choice, the bound (5) on Dn (which bounds (5) and (8)) reads∑∞
t=1E[ht] ≤ D∞ ≤ K(µ) ln 2 (13)
i.e. the number of times, ξ deviates from µ or lΛξ deviates from lΛµ by more than ε>0
is bounded by O(K(µ)), i.e. is proportional to the complexity of the environment.
Could other choices for wν lead to better bounds? The answer is essentially no
[Hut04]: Consider any other reasonable prior w′ν , where reasonable means (lower
semi)computable with a program of size O(1). Then, MDL bound (11e) with P ();
w′() and x ; 〈µ〉 shows K(µ)
+≤ − log2w′µ+K(w′()), hence lnw′µ−1
+≥K(µ)ln2 leads
(within an additive constant) to a weaker bound. A counting argument also shows
that O(K(µ)) errors for most µ are unavoidable. So this choice of prior leads to
very good prediction.
Even for continuous classes M, we can assign a (proper) universal prior (not
density) wUθ = 2
−K(θ) > 0 for computable θ, and 0 for uncomputable ones. This
effectively reduces M to a discrete class {νθ ∈M :wUθ >0} which is typically dense
in M. We will see that this prior has many advantages over the classical prior
densities.
4 Independent Identically Distributed Data
I now compare the classical continuous prior densities to the universal prior on classes
of i.i.d. environments. I present some standard critiques to the former, illustrated
on Bayes-Laplace’s classical Bernoulli class with uniform prior: the problem of zero
p(oste)rior, non-confirmation of universal hypotheses, and reparametrization and
regrouping non-invariance. I show that the universal prior does not suffer from
these problems. Finally I complement the general total bounds of Section 2 with
some i.i.d.-specific instantaneous bounds.
Laplace’s rule for Bernoulli sequences. Let x = x1x2...xn ∈ X n = {0,1}n be
generated by a biased coin with head=1 probability θ∈ [0,1], i.e. the likelihood of
x under hypothesis Hθ is νθ(x) = P[x|Hθ] = θn1(1−θ)n0 , where n1 = x1+ ...+xn =
n−n0. Bayes [Bay63] assumed a uniform prior density w(θ)= 1. The evidence is
ξ(x)=
∫ 1
0
νθ(x)w(θ) dθ=
n1!n0!
(n+1)!
and the posterior probability weight density w(θ|x)=
νθ(x)w(θ)/ξ(x) =
(n+1)!
n1!n0!
θn1(1−θ)n0 of θ after seeing x is strongly peaked around
the frequency estimate θˆ= n1
n
for large n. Laplace [Lap12] asked for the predictive
probability ξ(1|x) of observing xn+1=1 after having seen x=x1...xn, which is ξ(1|x)=
ξ(x1)
ξ(x)
= n1+1
n+2
. (Laplace believed that the sun had risen for 5 000 years = 1 826 213
days since creation, so he concluded that the probability of doom, i.e. that the sun
won’t rise tomorrow is 1
1826215
.) This looks like a reasonable estimate, since it is
close to the relative frequency, asymptotically consistent, symmetric, even defined
for n=0, and not overconfident (never assigns probability 1).
The problem of zero prior. But also Laplace’s rule is not without problems. The
appropriateness of the uniform prior has been questioned in Section 3 and will be
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detailed below. Here I discuss a version of the zero prior problem. If the prior is zero,
then the posterior is necessarily also zero. The above example seems unproblematic,
since the prior and posterior densities w(θ) and w(θ|x) are non-zero. Nevertheless
it is problematic e.g. in the context of scientific confirmation theory [Ear93].
Consider the hypothesis H that all balls in some urn, or all ravens, are black
(=1). A natural model is to assume that balls (or ravens) are drawn randomly from
an infinite population with fraction θ of black balls (or ravens) and to assume a
uniform prior over θ, i.e. just the Bayes-Laplace model. Now we draw n objects and
observe that they are all black.
We may formalize H as the hypothesis H ′ := {θ= 1}. Although the posterior
probability of the relaxed hypothesis Hε := {θ≥1−ε}, P[Hε|1n]=
∫ 1
1−ε
w(θ|1n) dθ=∫ 1
1−ε
(n+1)θndθ=1−(1−ε)n+1 tends to 1 for n→∞ for every fixed ε>0, P[H ′|1n]=
P[H0|1n] remains identically zero, i.e. no amount of evidence can confirm H ′. The
reason is simply that zero prior P[H ′]=0 implies zero posterior.
Note that H ′ refers to the unobservable quantity θ and only demands blackness
with probability 1. So maybe a better formalization of H is purely in terms of obser-
vational quantities: H ′′ :={ω1:∞=1∞}. Since ξ(1n)= 1n+1 , the predictive probability
of observing k further black objects is ξ(1k|1n)= ξ(1n+k)
ξ(1n)
= n+1
n+k+1
. While for fixed k
this tends to 1, P[H ′′|1n]=limk→∞ξ(1k|1n)≡0 ∀n, as for H ′.
One may speculate that the crux is the infinite population. But for a finite
population of size N and sampling with (similarly without) repetition, P[H ′′|1n]=
ξ(1N−n|1n)= n+1
N+1
is close to one only if a large fraction of objects has been observed.
This contradicts scientific practice: Although only a tiny fraction of all existing
ravens have been observed, we regard this as sufficient evidence for believing strongly
in H . This quantifies [Mah04, Thm.11] and shows that Maher does not solve the
problem of confirmation of universal hypotheses.
There are two solutions of this problem: We may abandon strict/logical/all-
quantified/universal hypotheses altogether in favor of soft hypotheses like Hε. Al-
though not unreasonable, this approach is unattractive for several reasons. The other
solution is to assign a non-zero prior to θ=1. Consider, for instance, the improper
density w(θ)= 1
2
[1+δ(1−θ)], where δ is the Dirac-delta (∫ f(θ)δ(θ−a) dθ=f(a)), or
equivalently P[θ≥ a] = 1− 1
2
a. We get ξ(x1:n)=
1
2
[ n1!n0!
(n+1)!
+δ0n0 ], where δij = {1 if i=j0 else }
is Kronecker’s δ. In particular ξ(1n)= 1
2
n+2
n+1
is much larger than for uniform prior.
Since ξ(1k|1n)= n+k+2
n+k+1
· n+1
n+2
, we get P[H ′′|1n]=limk→∞ξ(1k|1n)= n+1n+2→1, i.e. H ′′ gets
strongly confirmed by observing a reasonable number of black objects. This correct
asymptotics also follows from the general result (3). Confirmation of H ′′ is also
reflected in the fact that ξ(0|1n)= 1
(n+2)2
tends much faster to zero than for uniform
prior, i.e. the confidence that the next object is black is much higher. The power
actually depends on the shape of w(θ) around θ=1. Similarly H ′ gets confirmed:
P[H ′|1n]=µ1(1n)P[θ=1]/ξ(1n)= n+1n+2→1. On the other hand, if a single (or more)
0 are observed (n0>0), then the predictive distribution ξ(·|x) and posterior w(θ|x)
are the same as for uniform prior.
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The findings above remain qualitatively valid for i.i.d. processes over finite non-
binary alphabet |X |>2 and for non-uniform prior.
Surely to get a generally working setup, we should also assign a non-zero prior
to θ=0 and to all other “special” θ, like 1
2
and 1
6
, which may naturally appear in a
hypothesis, like “is the coin or die fair”. The natural continuation of this thought
is to assign non-zero prior to all computable θ. This is another motivation for the
universal prior wUθ = 2
−K(θ) (12) constructed in Section 3. It is difficult but not
impossible to operate with such a prior [PH04, PH06]. One may want to mix the
discrete prior wUν with a continuous (e.g. uniform) prior density, so that the set of
non-computable θ keeps a non-zero density. Although possible, we will see that this
is actually not necessary.
Reparametrization invariance. Naively, the uniform prior is justified by the in-
difference principle, but as discussed in Section 3, uniformity is not reparametriza-
tion invariant. For instance if in our Bernoulli example we introduce a new
parametrization θ′=
√
θ, then the θ′-density w′(θ′)=2
√
θw(θ) is no longer uniform
if w(θ)=1 is uniform.
More generally, assume we have some principle which leads to some prior w(θ).
Now we apply the principle to a different parametrization θ′∈Θ′ and get prior w′(θ′).
Assume that θ and θ′ are related via bijection θ=f(θ′). Another way to get a θ′-prior
is to transform the θ-prior w(θ);w˜(θ′). The reparametrization invariance principle
(RIP) states that w′ should be equal to w˜.
For discrete Θ, simply w˜θ′=wf(θ′), and a uniform prior remains uniform (w
′
θ′=
w˜θ′=wθ=
1
|Θ|
) in any parametrization, i.e. the indifference principle satisfies RIP in
finite model classes.
In case of densities, we have w˜(θ′)=w(f(θ′))df(θ
′)
dθ′
, and the indifference principle
violates RIP for non-linear transformations f . But Jeffrey’s and Bernardo’s principle
satisfy RIP. For instance, in the Bernoulli case we have ¯n(θ)=
1
θ
+ 1
1−θ
, hence w(θ)=
1
π
[θ(1−θ)]−1/2 and w′(θ′)= 1
π
[f(θ′)(1−f(θ′))]−1/2 df(θ′)
dθ′
= w˜(θ′).
Does the universal prior wUθ = 2
−K(θ) satisfy RIP? If we apply the “univer-
sality principle” to a θ′-parametrization, we get w′θ′
U = 2−K(θ
′). On the other
hand, wθ simply transforms to w˜
U
θ′ = w
U
f(θ′) = 2
−K(f(θ′)) (wθ is a discrete (non-
density) prior, which is non-zero on a discrete subset of M). For computable f
we have K(f(θ′))
+≤K(θ′)+K(f) by (11d), and similarly K(f−1(θ)) +≤K(θ)+K(f)
if f is invertible. Hence for simple bijections f i.e. for K(f) = O(1), we have
K(f(θ′))
+
=K(θ′), which implies w′θ′
U ×= w˜Uθ′, i.e. the universal prior satisfies RIP w.r.t.
simple transformations f (within a multiplicative constant).
Regrouping invariance. There are important transformations f which are not
bijections, which we consider in the following. A simple non-bijection is θ=f(θ′)=
θ′2 if we consider θ′ ∈ [−1,1]. More interesting is the following example: Assume
we had decided not to record blackness versus non-blackness of objects, but their
“color”. For simplicity of exposition assume we record only whether an object is
black or white or colored, i.e. X ′ = {B,W,C}. In analogy to the binary case we
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use the indifference principle to assign a uniform prior on θ′ ∈ Θ′ := ∆3, where
∆d := {θ′ ∈ [0,1]d :
∑d
i=1θ
′
i = 1}, and νθ′(x′1:n) =
∏
iθ
′
i
ni. All inferences regarding
blackness (predictive and posterior) are identical to the binomial model νθ(x1:n)=
θn1(1−θ)n0 with x′t=B ; xt=1 and x′t=W orC ; xt=0 and θ=f(θ′)= θ′B and
w(θ)=
∫
∆3
w′(θ′)δ(θ′B−θ)dθ′. Unfortunately, for uniform prior w′(θ′)∝1, w(θ)∝1−θ
is not uniform, i.e. the indifference principle is not invariant under splitting/grouping,
or general regrouping. Regrouping invariance is regarded as a very important and
desirable property [Wal96].
I now consider general i.i.d. processes νθ(x)=
∏d
i=1θ
ni
i . Dirichlet priors w(θ)∝∏d
i=1θ
αi−1
i form a natural conjugate class (w(θ|x)∝
∏d
i=1θ
ni+αi−1
i ) and are the default
priors for multinomial (i.i.d.) processes over finite alphabet X of size d. Note that
ξ(a|x)= na+αa
n+α1+...+αd
generalizes Laplace’s rule and coincides with Carnap’s [Car52]
confirmation function. Symmetry demands α1= ...=αd; for instance α≡1 for uni-
form and α≡ 1
2
for Bernard-Jeffrey’s prior. Grouping two “colors” i and j results in
a Dirichlet prior with αi&j=αi+αj for the group. The only way to respect symmetry
under all possible groupings is to set α≡0. This is Haldane’s improper prior, which
results in unacceptably overconfident predictions ξ(1|1n)=1. Walley [Wal96] solves
the problem that there is no single acceptable prior density by considering sets of
priors.
I now show that the universal prior wUθ =2
−K(θ) is invariant under regrouping,
and more generally under all simple (computable with complexity O(1)) even non-
bijective transformations. Consider prior w′θ′ . If θ= f(θ
′) then w′θ′ transforms to
w˜θ=
∑
θ′:f(θ′)=θw
′
θ′ (note that for non-bijections there is more than one w
′
θ′ consistent
with w˜θ). In θ
′-parametrization, the universal prior reads w′θ′
U=2−K(θ
′). Using (11f)
with x=〈θ′〉 and y=〈θ〉 we get
w˜Uθ =
∑
θ′:f(θ′)=θ
2−K(θ
′) ×= 2−K(θ) = wUθ
i.e. the universal prior is general transformation and hence regrouping invariant
(within a multiplicative constant) w.r.t. simple computable transformations f .
Note that reparametrization and regrouping invariance hold for arbitrary classes
M and are not limited to the i.i.d. case.
Instantaneous bounds. The cumulative bounds (5) and (10) stay valid for i.i.d.
processes, but instantaneous bounds are now also possible. For i.i.d. M with con-
tinuous, discrete, and universal prior, respectively, one can show (in preparation;
see [Kri98, PH04, PH06] for related bounds)
E[hn]
×≤ 1
n
lnw(θ0)
−1 and E[hn]
×≤ 1
n
lnw−1θ0 =
1
n
K(θ0) ln 2 (14)
Note that, if summed up over n, they lead to weaker cumulative bounds.
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5 Universal Sequence Prediction
Section 3 derived the universal prior and Section 4 discussed i.i.d. classes. What
remains and will be done in this section is to find a universal class of environments,
namely Solomonoff-Levin’s class of all (lower semi)computable (semi)measures. The
resulting universal mixture is equivalent to the output distribution of a universal
Turing machine with uniform input distribution. The universal prior avoids the
problem of old evidence and the universal class avoids the necessity of updatingM.
I discuss the general total bounds of Section 2 for the specific universal mixture,
and supplement them with some weak instantaneous bounds. Finally, I show that
the universal mixture performs better than classical continuous mixtures, even in
uncomputable environments.
Universal choice of M. The bounds of Section 2 apply if M contains the true
environment µ. The larger M the less restrictive is this assumption. The class
of all computable distributions, although only countable, is pretty large from a
practical point of view. (Finding a non-computable physical system would overturn
the Church-Turing thesis.) It is the largest class, relevant from a computational
point of view. Solomonoff [Sol64, Eq.(13)] defined and studied the mixture over this
class.
One problem is that this class is not enumerable, since the class of computable
functions f :X ∗→IR is not enumerable (halting problem), nor is it decidable whether
a function is a measure. Hence ξ is completely incomputable. Levin [ZL70] had the
idea to “slightly” extend the class and include also lower semi-computable semimea-
sures. One can show that this class MU={ν1,ν2,...} is enumerable, hence
ξU(x) =
∑
ν∈MU
wUν ν(x) (15)
is itself lower semi-computable, i.e. ξU∈MU , which is a convenient property in itself.
Note that since 1
nlog2n
×≤wUνn≤ 1n for most n by (11b) and (11c), most νn have prior
approximately reciprocal to their index n, as advocated by Jeffreys [Jef61, p238] and
Rissanen [Ris83].
In some sense MU is the largest class of environments for which ξ is in some
sense computable [Hut03b, Hut06], but see [Sch02a] for even larger classes. Note
that including non-semi-computable ν would not affect ξU , since w
U
ν = 0 on such
environments.
The problem of old evidence. An important problem in Bayesian inference
in general and (Bayesian) confirmation theory [Ear93] in particular is how to deal
with ‘old evidence’ or equivalently with ‘new theories’. How shall a Bayesian treat
the case when some evidence E=̂x (e.g. Mercury’s perihelion advance) is known
well-before the correct hypothesis/theory/model H=̂µ (Einstein’s general relativity
theory) is found? How shall H be added to the Bayesian machinery a posteriori?
What is the prior of H? Should it be the belief in H in a hypothetical counterfactual
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world in which E is not known? Can old evidence E confirm H? After all, H could
simply be constructed/biased/fitted towards “explaining” E.
The universal class MU and universal prior wUν formally solve this problem:
The universal prior of H is 2−K(H). This is independent of M and of whether
E is known or not. If we use E to construct H or fit H to explain E, this will
lead to a theory which is more complex (K(H)
+≥K(E)) than a theory from scratch
(K(H)=O(1)), so cheats are automatically penalized. There is no problem of adding
hypotheses to M a posteriori. Priors of old hypotheses are not affected. Finally,
MU includes all hypotheses (including yet unknown or unnamed ones) a priori. So
at least theoretically, updating M is unnecessary.
Other representations of ξU. Definition (15) is somewhat complex, relying on
enumeration of semimeasures and Kolmogorov complexity. I now approach ξU from
a different perspective. Assume that our world is governed by a computable deter-
ministic process describable in ≤ l bits. Consider a standard (not prefix) Turing
machine U ′ and programs p generating environments starting with x. Let us pad
all programs so that they have length exactly l. Among the 2l programs of length
l there are Nl(x) :=#{p∈{0,1}l :U ′(p)=x∗} programs consistent with observation
x. If we regard all environmental descriptions p∈ {0,1}l a priori as equally likely
(Epicurus) we should adopt the relative frequency Nl(x)/2
l as our prior belief in x.
Since we do not know l and we can pad every p arbitrarily, we could take the limit
M(x) := liml→∞Nl(x)/2
l (which exists, since Nl(x)/2
l increases). Or equivalently:
M(x) is the probability that U ′ outputs a string starting with x when provided with
uniform random noise on the program tape. Note that a uniform distribution is also
used in the No Free Lunch theorems [WM97] to prove the impossibility of universal
learners, but in our case the uniform distribution is piped through a universal Turing
machine which defeats these negative implications. Yet another representation ofM
is as follows: For every q printing x∗ there exists a shortest prefix (called minimal)
p of q printing x. p possesses 2l−ℓ(p) prolongations to length l, all printing x∗. Hence
all prolongations of p together yield a contribution 2l−ℓ(p)/2l=2−ℓ(p) to M(x). Let
U(p)=x∗ iff p is a minimal program printing a string starting with x. Then
M(x) =
∑
p:U(p)=x∗
2−ℓ(p) (16)
which may be regarded as a 2−ℓ(p)-weighted mixture over all computable determin-
istic environments νp (νp(x)=1 if U(p)=x∗ and 0 else). Now, as a positive surprise,
M(x) coincides with ξU(x) within an irrelevant multiplicative constant. So it is ac-
tually sufficient to consider the class of deterministic semimeasures. The reason is
that the probabilistic semimeasures are in the convex hull of the deterministic ones,
and so need not be taken extra into account in the mixture. One can also get an
explicit enumeration of all lower semi-computable semimeasuresMU={ν1,ν2,...} by
means of νi(x):=
∑
p:Ti(p)=x∗
2−ℓ(p), where Ti(p)≡U(〈i〉p), i=1,2,... is an enumeration
of all monotone Turing machines.
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Bounds for computable environments. The bound (13) surely is applicable for
ξ= ξU and now holds for any computable measure µ. Within an additive constant
the bound is also valid for M ×= ξ. That is, ξU and M are excellent predictors
with the only condition that the sequence is drawn from any computable probability
distribution. Bound (13) shows that the total number of prediction errors is small.
Similarly to (3) one can show that
∑n
t=1|1−M(xt|x<t)| ≤Km(x1:n)ln2, where the
monotone complexity Km(x) := min{ℓ(p) : U(p) = x∗} is defined as the length of
the shortest (nonhalting) program computing a string starting with x [ZL70, LV97,
Hut04].
If x1:∞ is a computable sequence, then Km(x1:∞) is finite, which implies
M(xt|x<t)→ 1 on every computable sequence. This means that if the environment
is a computable sequence (whichsoever, e.g. 1∞ or the digits of π or e), after having
seen the first few digits, M correctly predicts the next digit with high probability,
i.e. it recognizes the structure of the sequence. In particular, observing an increas-
ing number of black balls or black ravens or sunrises, M(1|1n)→1 (Km(1∞)=O(1))
becomes rapidly confident that future balls and ravens are black and that the sun
will rise tomorrow.
Total bounds (3) and (13) are suitable in an online setting, but given a fixed
number of n observations, they give no guarantee on the next instance.
Weak instantaneous bounds. In Section 4, I derived good instantaneous bounds
for i.i.d. classes. For coin or die flips or balls drawn from an urn this model is ap-
propriate. But ornithologists do not really sample ravens independently at random.
Although not strictly valid, the i.i.d. model may in this case still serve as a useful
proxy for the true process. But to model the rise of the sun as an i.i.d. process is
more than questionable. On the other hand it is plausible that these examples (and
other processes like weather or stock-market) are governed by some (probabilistic)
computable process. So model classMU and predictor M seem appropriate. While
excellent total bounds (3) and (13) exist, the essentially only instantaneous bound I
was able to derive (proof in Appendix A) is
2−K(n)
×≤ M(x¯n|x<n) ×≤ 22Km(x1:n)−K(n) (17)
valid for all n and x1:n and x¯n 6=xn. I discuss the bound for the sequence x1:∞=1∞,
but most of what I say remains valid for any other computable sequence. Since
Km(1n)=O(1), we get
M(0|1n) ×= 2−K(n)
Since 2−K(n) ≤ 1
n
for most n, this shows that M quickly disbelieves in non-black
objects and doomsday, similarly as in the i.i.d. model, but now only for most n.
Magic numbers. This ‘most’ qualification has interesting consequences: M(0|1n)
spikes up for simple n. So M is cautious at magic instance numbers, e.g. fears
doom on day 220 more than on a comparable random day. While this looks odd
and pours water on the mills of prophets, it is not completely absurd. For instance,
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major software problems have been anticipated for the magic date, 1st of January
2000. There are many other occasions, where something happens at “magic” dates
or instances; for instance solar eclipses.
Also, certain processes in nature follow fast growing sequences like those of the
powers of two (e.g. the number of cells in an early human embryo) or the Fibonacci
numbers (e.g. the number of petals or the arrangement of seeds in some flowers).
Finally, that numbers with low (Kolmogorov) complexity cause high probability in
real data bases can readily be verified by counting their frequency in the world wide
web with Google [CV06].
On the other hand, (returning to sequence prediction) on most simple dates,
nothing exceptional happens. Due to the total bound
∑∞
n=0M(0|1n) ≤ O(1), M
cannot spike up too much too often. M tells us to be more prepared but not to
expect the unexpected on those days. Another issue is that often we do not know the
exact start of the sequence. How many ravens exactly have ornithologists observed,
and how many days exactly did the sun rise so far? In absence of this knowledge
we need to Bayes-average over the sequence length which will wash out the spikes.
Universal is better than continuous M. Although I argued that incom-
putable environments µ can safely be ignored, one may be nevertheless uneasy using
Solomonoff’s M ×= ξU (16) if outperformed by a continuous mixture ξ (9) on such
µ ∈M\MU , for instance if M would fail to predict a Bernoulli(θ) sequence for
incomputable θ. Luckily this is not the case: Although νθ() and wθ can be incom-
putable, the studied classesM themselves, i.e. the two-argument function ν()(), and
the weight function w(), and hence ξ(), are typically computable (the integral can
be approximated to arbitrary precision). Hence M(x) ×= ξU(x)≥2−K(ξ)ξ(x) by (15)
and K(ξ) is often quite small. This implies for all µ
Dn(µ||M) ≡ E[ln µ(ω1:n)M(ω1:n) ] = E[ln
µ(ω1:n)
ξ(ω1:n)
]+E[ln ξ(ω1:n)
M(ω1:n)
]
+≤ Dn(µ||ξ)+K(ξ) ln2
So any bound (10) for Dn(µ||ξ) is directly valid also for Dn(µ||M), save an additive
constant. That is, M is superior (or equal) to all computable mixture predictors
ξ based on any (continuous or discrete) model class M and weight w(θ), even if
environment µ is not computable. Furthermore, while for essentially all parametric
classes, Dn(µ||ξ)∼ d2 lnn grows logarithmically in n for all (incl. computable) µ∈M,
Dn(µ||M)≤K(µ)ln2 is finite for computable µ. Bernardo’s prior even implies a
bound for M that is uniform (minimax) in θ∈Θ. Many other priors based on rea-
sonable principles are argued for (see Section 3 and [KW96]). The above shows that
M is superior to all of them. Actually the existence of any computable probabilistic
predictor ρ with Dn(µ||ρ)=o(n) is sufficient for M to predict µ equally well.
Future bounds. Another important question is how many errors are still to come
after some grace or learning period. Formally, given x1:n, how large is the future
expected error rn :=
∑∞
t=n+1E[ht|ω1:n=x1:n]? The total bound (5)+(13) only implies
that rn asymptotically tends to zero w.p.1, and the instantaneous bounds (14) and
(17) are weak and do not sum up finitely. Since the complexity of µ bounds the total
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loss, a natural guess is that something like the conditional complexity of µ given x
(on an extra input tape) bounds the future loss. Indeed one can show [Hut04, CH05]
∞∑
t=n+1
E[ht|ω1:n] +≤ [K(µ|ω1:n)+K(n)] ln 2 (18)
i.e. if our past observations ω1:n contain a lot of information about µ, we make
few errors in future. For instance, consider the large space X of pixel images, and
all observations are identical µ =̂ω = x1x1x1..., where x1 is a “typical” image of
complexity, say, K(x1)
+
=106
+
=Km(ω). Obviously, after seeing a couple of identical
images we expect the next one to be the same again. While total bound (13) quite
uselessly tells us that M makes less than 106 errors, future bound (18) with n=1
shows that M makes only K(µ|x1)=O(1) errors. The K(n) term can be improved
to the complexity of the randomness deficiency of ω1:n if a more suitable variant of
algorithmic complexity that is monotone in its condition is used [CH05, CHS07].
No future bounds analogous to (18) for general prior or class are known.
6 Discussion
Critique and problems. In practice we often have extra information about the
problem at hand, which could and should be used to guide the forecasting. One
way is to explicate all our prior knowledge y and place it on an extra input tape of
our universal Turing machine U , which leads to the conditional complexity K(·|y).
We now assign “subjective” prior wUν|y =2
−K(ν|y) to environment ν, which is large
for those ν that are simple (have short description) relative to our background
knowledge y. Since K(µ|y) +≤K(µ), extra knowledge never misguides (see (13)).
Alternatively we could prefix our observation sequence x by y and use M(yx) for
prediction [Hut04].
Another critique concerns the dependence of K and M on U . Predictions for
short sequences x (shorter than typical compiler lengths) can be arbitrary. But
taking into account our (whole) scientific prior knowledge y, and predicting the now
long string yx leads to good (less sensitive to “reasonable” U) predictions [Hut04].
For an interesting attempt to make M unique see [Mu¨l06].
Finally, K and M can serve as “gold standards” which practitioners should aim
at, but since they are only semi-computable, they have to be (crudely) approximated
in practice. Levin complexity [LV97], the speed prior [Sch02b], the minimal message
and description length principles [Ris89, Wal05], and off-the-shelf compressors like
Lempel-Ziv [LZ76] are such approximations, which have been successfully applied
to a plethora of problems [CV05, Sch04].
Summary. I compared traditional Bayesian sequence prediction based on con-
tinuous classes and prior densities to Solomonoff’s universal predictor M , prior
wUν , and class MU . I discussed the following advantages (+) and problems (−)
of Solomonoff’s approach:
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+ general total bounds for generic class, prior, and loss,
+ universal and i.i.d.-specific instantaneous and future bounds,
+ the Dn bound for continuous classes,
+ indifference/symmetry principles,
+ the problem of zero p(oste)rior and confirmation of universal hypotheses,
+ reparametrization and regrouping invariance,
+ the problem of old evidence and updating,
+ that M works even in non-computable environments,
+ how to incorporate prior knowledge,
− the prediction of short sequences,
− the constant fudges in all results and the U -dependence,
− M ’s incomputability and crude practical approximations.
In short, universal prediction solves or avoids or meliorates many foundational and
philosophical problems, but has to be compromised in practice.
Conclusion. The goal of the paper was to establish a single, universal theory
for (sequence) prediction and (hypothesis) confirmation, applicable to all inductive
inference problems. I started by showing that Bayesian prediction is consistent for
any countable model class, provided it contains the true distribution. The major
(agonizing) problem Bayesian statistics leaves open is how to choose the model
class and the prior. Solomonoff’s theory fills this gap by choosing the class of
all computable (stochastic) models, and a universal prior inspired by Ockham and
Epicurus, and quantified by Kolmogorov complexity. I discussed in breadth how
and in which sense this theory solves the inductive inference problem, by studying
a plethora of problems other approaches suffer from. In one line: All you need
for universal prediction is Ockham, Epicurus, Bayes, Solomonoff, Kolmogorov, and
Turing. By including Bellman, one can extend this theory to universal decisions in
reactive environments [Hut04].
Acknowledgements. I would like to thank Frank Stephan for his detailed feedback
on earlier drafts.
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A Proofs of (8), (11f), and (17)
Proof of loss bound (8). Let X and Y be real-valued random variables. Taking
the square root of the well-known Schwarz inequality (E[XY ])2 ≤E[X2]E[Y 2] we
get
E[(X−Y )2]− (
√
E[X2]−
√
E[Y 2] )2 ≡ 2
√
E[X2]E[Y 2]− 2E[XY ] ≥ 0.
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Substituting X ;
√
ai, Y ;
√
bi, E[...];
1
vΣ
∑
ivi... with vΣ :=
∑
ivi, we get, after
multiplying with vΣ, the “Hellinger” bound
(
√∑
i viai −
√∑
i vibi)
2 ≤ ∑i vi(√ai −√bi)2 (19)
for real ai,bi,vi≥0 (also valid for vΣ=0). I will use (19) three times in proving (8).
With the abbreviations m=yΛµt and s=y
Λξ
t and
X = {1, ..., N}, N = |X |, i = xt, yi = µ(xt|ω<t), zi = ξ(xt|ω<t)
the loss (7) and Hellinger distance (4) can then be expressed by lΛξt =
∑
iyiℓis, l
Λµ
t =∑
iyiℓim and ht=
∑
i(
√
zi−√yi)2. By definition (6) of yΛµt and yΛξt we have∑
i
yiℓim ≤
∑
i
yiℓij and
∑
i
ziℓis ≤
∑
i
ziℓij for all j. (20)
Actually, I need the first constraint only for j= s and the second for j=m. From
(20) we get√∑
i yiℓis −
√∑
i yiℓim ≥ 0 and (21)
[ ∂
∂ℓis
+ ∂
∂ℓim
](
√∑
i yiℓis −
√∑
i yiℓim) =
yi
2
( 1√∑
i yiℓis
− 1√∑
i yiℓim
)
≤ 0.
That is, if we decrease ℓis;ℓ
′
is :=ℓis−δi and ℓim;ℓ′im :=ℓim−δi by the same amount
δi, then (21) increases. The maximal possible δi := min{ℓis,ℓim} makes ℓ′is or ℓ′im
zero, hence 0≤ℓ′is+ℓ′im≤1. Similarly
0 ≤ √∑i ziℓim −√∑i ziℓis ≤ √∑i ziℓ′im −√∑i ziℓ′is
This implies
0 ≤ √lΛξt −√lΛµt ≡ √∑i yiℓis −√∑i yiℓim
≤ √∑i yiℓ′is −√∑i yiℓ′im + √∑i ziℓ′im −√∑i ziℓ′is
≤ √∑i ℓ′is(√yi−√zi)2 +√∑i ℓ′im(√yi−√zi)2
≤ √2∑i(ℓ′is+ℓ′im)(√yi−√zi)2 ≤ √2∑i(√yi−√zi)2 ≡ √2ht
In the third inequality I used the Hellinger bound (19) twice, and in the fourth
inequality I used
√
a+
√
b ≤√2(a+b). Without the reduction ℓ ; ℓ′ the bound
would have been a factor of
√
2 worse. Taking the square, expectation, and sum
over t proves the last inequality in (8). The first inequality in (8) is again an
instantiation of (19) with i; (t,ω<t) and vi ; µ(ω<t), i.e.
∑
ivi...;
∑
tE[...] and
ai; l
Λξ
t and bi; l
Λµ
t .
Proof of equation (11f). Function P (y) :=
∑
x:f(x)=y2
−K(x) is lower semi-
computable, since K(x) is upper semi-computable, all x∈X ∗ can be enumerated,
23
and f(x)=y is decidable. Further,
∑
yP (y)=
∑
x2
−K(x)≤1, hence MDL bound (11e)
implies K(y)
+≤−log2P (y)+K(P ). Let g(y)=min{x :f(y)=x} be the lexicograph-
ically first inverse of f . With K(P )
+≤K(f)=O(1), also function g has complexity
O(1). Hence
2−K(y)
×≥ P (y) ≡
∑
x:f(x)=y
2−K(x) ≥ 2−K(g(y)) ×≥ 2−K(y)
where I dropped all but the contribution from g(y) in the sum, and used (11d) for
g.
Proof of bound (17) M(x¯n|x<n)
×
≥ 2−K(n). For x=x<n∈X n−1 and a= x¯n∈X
we have
M(a|x) (a)= M(xa)
M(x)
(b)
=
∑
p:U(p)=xa∗ 2
−ℓ(p)∑
p:U(p)=x∗ 2
−ℓ(p)
(c)
≥
∑
p:U(p˜)=xa 2
−ℓ(p˜)∑
p:U(p)=x∗ 2
−ℓ(p)
(d)
= 2−ℓ(qn
∗)
(e)
×
= 2−K(n)
In (a) and (b) I simply inserted the definition (16) of M . I now (c) restrict the
sum over all p :U(p) = xa∗ in the numerator to programs p˜ of the following form:
p˜= qn∗p, where U(p) = x∗, n∗ is the shortest code of n, and q simulates p until
n−1 symbols are printed, then prints a, and thereafter halts, i.e. U(p˜)= xa. The
numerator now sums over exactly the same programs p as the denominator. Since
2−ℓ(p˜) = 2−ℓ(qn
∗)2−ℓ(p), and 2−ℓ(qn
∗) is a constant independent of p, numerator and
denominator cancel and (d) follows. (e) follows from the definition of n∗ and from
ℓ(q)=O(1).
Proof of bound (17) M(x¯n|x<n)
×
≤ 22Km(x1:n)−K(n). Assume x1:∞ is a com-
putable sequence, X is binary, and x¯n 6= xn, and define P (n) := M(x<nx¯n).
Given x1:∞, P can be semi-computed from below, hence K(P )
+≤Km(x1:∞).
Also
∑
nP (n) ≤ 1, since {x<nx¯n : n ∈ IN} forms a prefix-free set. Hence
K(n)
+≤ − log2P (n)+K(P ) by (11e), which implies M(x<nx¯n)
×≤ 2Km(x1:∞)−K(n).
Since M(x<n)≥2−Km(x<n)≥2−Km(x1:∞), we get M(x¯n|x<n) ×≤ 22Km(x1:∞)−K(n), which
nearly is (17). Since the l.h.s. is independent of xn+1:∞, a bound independent of it
should be (and is) possible, as we will now show.
Consider sequence x1:n and shortest program p printing x1:n∗. Let
Ut be U stopped after t time steps and define corresponding Mt. Then
Ut(p) = x1:nt (for some xn+1:nt if nt > n). I define Pt(n
′) :=
∑
a6=xn′
Mt(x<n′a)
for n′ ≤ nt and 0 for n′ > nt. With nt also Pt is computable and increasing,
hence P (n′) := limt→∞Pt(n
′) = suptPt(n
′) is lower semi-computable. Clearly
P (n′)=
∑
a6=xn′
M(x<n′a) for n
′≤n∞ and P (n′)=0 for n′>n∞ (n′∞=limtnt≤∞).
Hence
∑
n′P (n
′)≤1, since {x<n′a : a 6=xn′ , n′≤n∞} is a prefix free set, which implies
K(n)
+≤−log2P (n)+K(P ) by (11e). Since n≤n∞ and K(P )
+≤ ℓ(p)=Km(x1:n), we
get
∑
a6=xn
M(x<na)
×≤ 2Km(x1:n)−K(n). Using M(x<n)≥2−Km(x<n)≥2−Km(x1:n), we get
the desired bound M(x¯n|x<n)≤
∑
a6=xn
M(a|x<n) ×≤ 22Km(x1:n)−K(n).
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